Declassified documents from the Clinton Presidential Library offer a rare, behind-the-scenes look at the White House’s strategy in the final months of 1998, as the U.S. prepared to confront Saddam Hussein’s defiance of U.N. weapons inspections. The records reveal a broad international push to coordinate airstrikes, maintain diplomatic cohesion at the U.N., and manage geopolitical fallout with major players like France, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.
At the center was a clear goal: undermine Saddam’s weapons programs and political grip - without fracturing global alliances.
📞 Backchannel Diplomacy: Clinton Calls the Crown Prince and Chirac
With Saddam tightening restrictions on U.N. inspectors, the White House moved quickly to build consensus for a military response. Memos document urgent calls between President Clinton and leaders like Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and President Jacques Chirac of France.
"We must respond convincingly to Iraq’s latest actions," Clinton told Abdullah. "Without a convincing response, we risk making the Security Council irrelevant."
Saudi Arabia’s support was deemed critical, especially for airbase access. Clinton leaned on a 1998 Oval Office commitment from Abdullah that Saudi Arabia would back military action if diplomacy failed.
To France’s Chirac, Clinton stressed the broader stakes:
"If [Saddam] can effectively shut down UNSCOM with impunity, there must be a strong response, or the credibility of the Security Council will be shattered."
While Chirac expressed hesitation - fearing a strike might help Saddam rally support - he acknowledged the regime’s provocations left few diplomatic options.
🛑 A Pattern of Deception
Memos and talking points circulated within the National Security Council chronicle a growing impatience in Washington. U.S. officials believed Saddam was stalling, hiding documentation, and obstructing U.N. teams.
"He has made clear that his objective is to maintain his programs to develop and ultimately to deploy weapons of mass destruction," Clinton wrote in a personal letter to Russian President Yeltsin.
The documents show Clinton believed Saddam was leveraging inspection crises to force sanctions relief - all without compliance.
🚀 Operation Desert Fox: The Strike Plan
On December 15, 1998, President Clinton informed Crown Prince Abdullah of his final decision: a major airstrike was imminent.
"Our strike will be significant… with the aim to degrade his capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and weaken his regime," Clinton said in the call.
Military action commenced shortly after. While some Gulf states had misgivings, intelligence memos confirm that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the GCC bloc quietly backed the move, blaming Saddam for the crisis.
🌐 Russia’s Reluctant Alignment
The documents include multiple diplomatic cables and personal letters from Clinton to Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Despite Moscow’s long-standing opposition to strikes, Yeltsin ultimately acknowledged Iraq’s failure to cooperate.
Clinton pressed Yeltsin to send a strong message to Saddam:
"There must be no ambiguity… Iraq must provide full access and documentation. If not, we remain prepared to act."
Still, the Clinton-Yeltsin memos reflect the difficulty of balancing military necessity with the preservation of U.S.-Russia cooperation on arms control, economic recovery, and nonproliferation.
💬 The Aftermath
Within days of the strike, Clinton thanked Abdullah via diplomatic cable for Saudi Arabia’s quiet support. The message was clear: the U.S. saw this moment not only as a tactical blow to Baghdad, but as part of a broader regional strategy - one dependent on allied consensus, persistent diplomacy, and overwhelming force when needed.
