The event that brought the United States fully into the Vietnam War wasn’t a direct attack.
It was a cascade of misinterpreted sonar, misread radar signals, and communications breakdowns-followed by a decision to strike anyway.
This NSA study, titled "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish," shows how the infamous August 4, 1964 Gulf of Tonkin attack never happened-and how signals intelligence (SIGINT) failed to clarify the truth until it was far too late.
"It is not simply that there is a different story as seen from the signals intelligence-it is that no attack happened that night."
🛥️ What Was Supposed to Have Happened
On the night of August 4, the destroyers USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy believed they were under attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. They reported radar sightings, sonar echoes, and fired into the darkness at what they believed were enemy vessels.
The next day, President Lyndon Johnson ordered retaliatory airstrikes.
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed within days, giving the president sweeping war powers. But the NSA’s retrospective analysis says plainly: there were no enemy boats.
🛰️ What SIGINT Showed-and Didn’t Show
The NSA had signals intelligence assets monitoring Vietnamese communications.
On August 2 (two days earlier), there had been an actual attack on the USS Maddox.
But on August 4, the intercepts told a different story.
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No North Vietnamese orders to attack
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No intercepted communications matching an engagement
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No observed movement of enemy naval forces near the destroyers
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Later analysis showed U.S. sonar returns likely came from weather conditions or ship wakes
"SIGINT did not support the assumption that an attack was underway."
Even more striking: later translations of Vietnamese intercepts indicated that the North Vietnamese believed they were under attack, not launching one.
🔧 The Anatomy of Error
The report outlines several root causes:
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Commanders were predisposed to believe an attack was imminent
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Equipment glitches produced false radar and sonar contacts
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Poor weather distorted acoustic signals
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Psychological pressure and confusion made routine actions seem hostile
Crews saw "skunks" (unidentified radar returns), launched flares, and fired at phantom targets-only to realize hours later that they’d been shooting at nothing.
📜 The Aftermath
Despite intelligence doubts, the official narrative of an attack held. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed by Congress with only two dissenting votes.
For years, it was cited as the legal basis for expanded U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia.
This declassified study, published decades later, admits:
"The signals intelligence was, in fact, more consistent with no attack than with an attack."
🕳️ A War Built on Shadows
The Tonkin incident was not an intelligence failure in the traditional sense-it was a failure of interpretation under pressure.
SIGINT wasn’t ignored. It just wasn’t trusted in the moment.
And once a narrative had formed, it couldn’t be pulled back.
Tens of thousands would die in a war justified by what this report now calls a phantom encounter.
