A translated and declassified audio transcript reveals Saddam Hussein’s innermost calculations as Iraq prepared to invade Iran in September 1980.
In a candid, hours-long meeting with senior Ba’ath Party and military officials, Saddam lays out his rationale, strategy, and concerns-marking a chilling prelude to one of the longest and deadliest conflicts of the 20th century.
The transcript, dated just days before the official start of the Iran-Iraq War, offers rare insight into Saddam’s mindset as he made the case for abandoning the 1975 Algiers Agreement and retaking disputed territory along the Shatt al-Arab waterway.
“We gave Iran all this time… That’s enough. A year and a half and they didn’t return the lands… This necessitates that we regain it with blood and weapons.”
🌊 The Shatt al-Arab Dispute: From Treaty to Invasion
Saddam saw Iran’s rejection of the Algiers Agreement as a national insult and an existential threat.
Signed in 1975 to resolve boundary disputes and Kurdish insurgencies, the agreement had been renounced by Iran’s revolutionary regime. Saddam interpreted this as a green light to reclaim territory by force.
In the transcript, Saddam references specific geographic flashpoints-Zayn al-Qus and Sayf Sa’ad-which Iraqi forces had already retaken.
He portrays the Algiers Accord as obsolete, citing Iranian violations and Kurdish collaboration with Tehran as grounds for war.
“The agreement is dead now. The agreement has ended, legally and nationally… We will retake the Shatt al-Arab the way it was before the Algiers Agreement.”
🌪️ Calculating Conflict: Ammunition, Morale, and Messaging
The meeting reveals a deeply calculated move. Saddam and his generals reviewed Iraq’s military readiness, ammunition levels, and the psychological needs of both the army and the Arab public.
He insists that international opinion must view Iraq as reclaiming stolen land-not as the aggressor.
Saddam knew he was taking a gamble. Supplies were limited. Regional alliances were unstable. The Soviet Union’s position was uncertain. But Saddam believed timing and perception could offset the risks.
“There is no one who can guarantee this. Can you deny that Iran will possibly confront you with force? No… But we should not be ashamed. If we have the capability to take everything back, we should do it.”
⚖️ Justifying the Invasion: Law, Legacy, and Propaganda
Throughout the discussion, Saddam emphasizes legal justifications for the invasion. He details how Iran’s failure to meet treaty obligations invalidates the agreement.
But these legal arguments are also framed as propaganda tools-meant to persuade international audiences and the Arab street.
He also makes ideological appeals to Ba’athist unity and historical destiny. He cites the Prophet Muhammad and invokes the pain of past military sacrifices to frame the war as both necessary and honorable.
“No patriotic person would let go of what is rightfully his… Our land is precious. Anyone who takes our land, be it the Shah of Iran or Khomeini, we would do the same.”
🌋 Risks, Oil, and Escalation
Saddam and his advisers knew the potential consequences. They discussed the vulnerability of oil facilities, navigation on the Shatt al-Arab, and the possibility of Iranian retaliation.
The transcript reveals planning for worst-case scenarios and an awareness of how fast conflict could spiral.
“This is war… When our facilities are burned, theirs will be on fire too… We will retaliate immediately.”
The conversation even touched on wider geopolitical implications-including Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, relations with the Soviets, and fears of being isolated or drained in a prolonged conflict.
Saddam references Kuwait, Syria, and other Arab regimes as potentially unreliable or even traitorous.
📳 Saddam the Strategist: Media, Messaging, and Morale
The document also exposes Saddam’s attention to detail in controlling the narrative. He ordered the media to avoid anti-Persian racism, tailored messages for Arab and Persian audiences, and emphasized psychological warfare.
He insisted that even ship navigation in the Shatt al-Arab be enforced to assert full Iraqi sovereignty.
“Say we have an Italian cargo ship… it must raise the Iraqi flag… If they don’t, then our navigator will punch the captain and that means a fight in the middle of the Shatt al-Arab.”
Saddam’s blending of bravado and paranoia is unmistakable.
He alternates between proclaiming restraint and threatening total retaliation, revealing a regime on the brink of war, intoxicated by its own ideological vision and perceived historical opportunity.